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Abstract
Survival of firms requires continuous search for new and a restructuring of the 
existing competitive advantages. These can come either from firms’ internal factors 
or from cooperation with the environment. Cooperation among firms commonly 
takes place through the formation of strategic alliances. However, such form of 
cooperation presents only one stage in the integration of business entities. In the 
long run, strategic alliances can cease to exist or transform into a higher form of 
association based on capital integration. The objective of this paper is to explore 
the determinants of capital integration among strategic alliance member firms 
in retail sectors of several Central and Southeast European countries. Overall, 
the obtained findings suggest that business entities engage in integration with 
the aim of reaching hidden knowledge and skills, accessing distribution and 
supply channels, and developing new products and services. Integration is also 
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driven with the aim of risk diversification and possible better market positioning, 
achieving the economies of scale, and improving organization and marketing. 
The opportunistic behavior of partners and limited managerial control represent 
its strongest barriers. 
Keywords: strategic alliance, capital integration, retail, CEEC, SEEC
JEL classification: D22, D74 
1  Introduction
The survival of firms in modern times frequently requires various forms of 
cooperation. For many firms these processes happen through the formation of 
strategic alliances. However, such form of cooperation presents only one stage 
in the integration of business entities. In the long run, strategic alliances can 
cease to exist or transform into a higher form of association based on capital 
integration. Institutionalization of strategic alliances through capital integration 
enables numerous benefits in terms of both revenues and costs. On the one hand, 
greater negotiating power and financial consolidation lead to cost efficiency. On 
the other hand, capital integration enables market differentiation thus paving 
the way for better competitiveness, higher market share and growth of revenues. 
Finally, capital integration improves the ability of a business entity to resist a 
hostile takeover. 
Transformation of strategic alliance into institutionalized form of cooperation 
comes with numerous challenges for the involved business entities. These can 
take the form of a restructuring, an introduction of new organizational practices 
and may require willingness to make compromise in decision-making. The latter 
is of particular challenge for firms where management and ownership are not 
separated. Capital integration also paves the way for changes in management 
as some overlapping positions become redundant. In addition to these factors, 
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the propensity of some strategic alliance members towards capital integration is 
determined by a number of other factors. Differences in performance can act 
as an obstacle to further development and strengthening of strategic alliances 
and thus reduce the readiness for capital integration. In a parallel development, 
the misalignment between subjective valuation of owners and an independent 
assessment of the value of their firms can yield a similar effect. The decision on 
capital integration is also related to expectations about the effects of planned 
synergy and the attitude of owners and managers towards the loss of independence 
and control.
Keeping the above said in mind, the objective of this paper is to explore which 
factors and forces determine the propensity of strategic alliance members towards 
capital integration. To this end, the research posits several questions. What is the 
impact of individual performance of strategic alliance members on propensity 
towards capital integration? Does value assessment determine the decision on 
capital integration? What is the impact of expected future profits on capital 
integration? To what extent do loss of independence and control determine the 
decision on capital integration? 
The answer these questions, a survey was conducted among the owners and 
managers of more than 700 business entities in retail sectors of several Central 
and Southeast European countries (CEECs and SEECs) (Croatia, Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). The analysis was undertaken with the means of a multinomial logit 
econometric technique which enables the assessment of the impact of individual 
determinants on the differences in propensity of strategic alliance member firms 
towards capital integration. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 
two provides a theoretical framework of research, while a review of the existing 
literature is undertaken in the third Section. The dataset is presented in Section 
four. The model and methodology of investigation is discussed in Section five, 
followed by a presentation of findings in Section six. Section seven provides the 
concluding remarks. 
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2  Theoretical Framework
Survival and expansion of business entities requires continuous upgrading of 
the existing and the development of new competitive advantages. This process 
can take place either through one’s own resources or through cooperation with 
other business entities. One of the most common forms of association between 
business entities are strategic alliances and joint ventures. The weakness of such 
organizational forms reflects itself primarily in a limited period of duration, 
narrowly defined as a purpose of cooperation and the inability of a response 
to complex business challenges in a high-risk environment (Yin and Shanley, 
2008). An alternative form of cooperation is the institutional association or 
capital integration where two or more business entities merge their resources 
through joint ownership. 
Over the past decades, several economic schools of thought have attempted 
to explain the motives of business entities for resource integration instead of 
market interactions. Within this literature, economies of scale, knowledge and 
technology transfer, as well as the ease of access to suppliers and distributors are 
often cited as reasons for preference of capital integration over weaker forms of 
association such as strategic alliances. To this end, one can distinguish views of 
resource dependence theory, transaction costs economics, industrial organization, 
and institutional economics. 
According to resource dependence theory, the primary reason behind the 
integration of business entities is the greater negotiating power over suppliers. 
Within this line of thinking, the market power of some business entities over 
others lies in the role of the resource supplier. From the buyers’ perspective, 
such relationship presents a continuous source of uncertainty about the 
terms of transactions, which put them in an unfavorable position. For all the 
mentioned, upstream positioned business entities (buyers) will tend to reduce 
their dependence on external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Hillman, 
Withers and Collins, 2009; Davis and Cobb, 2010). 
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The achievement of a previously defined objective is possible in two ways. On 
the one hand, one’s own efforts can be invested in search for alternative resources 
to reduce the dependency on a particular supplier. On the other hand, resource 
dependence theory notes that the negotiating power of buyers increases whereas 
that of suppliers is being reduced with an increase in the size of buyers. Business 
entities will, therefore, invest their efforts in the achievement of higher growth 
rates. However, in the context of this paper, the most important contribution of 
resource dependence theory is that it points towards association among business 
entities as a potential channel for the diminishment of suppliers’ negotiating 
powers whether through strategic alliances or institutional association. From 
there it follows that the vertically integrated association of business entities 
primarily takes place with the aim of reducing and eliminating opportunistic 
behavior of vertically related business entities.
Association can also emerge among horizontally related business entities. Here, 
firms are confronted with a trade-off. Individual efforts to find alternative 
resources enable a wide autonomy in decision-making. At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, institutional binding with other business entities entails a loss 
of freedom over decision-making. Resource dependence theory notes that 
horizontal association entails a loss of control and management while leading 
to lower effects of reduced interdependencies than those that could be achieved 
through diversification. The message, which can be discerned from the literature, 
is that the loss of power and decision rights destimulates owners and managers 
towards institutional binding. Hence, business entities will favor such behavior 
only when considerable control over a potential partner is required.
Transaction costs economics puts the choice of business entities between 
strategic alliance and capital integration in the context of uncertainty over 
market transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Capital integration in this 
context is an attempt of firms to prevent opportunistic behavior of those business 
entities on which they depend in the supply of resources or other goods and 
services. Under market imperfections, frequent transactions of specific resources 
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expose business entities to the risk of changing business conditions or even to the 
hold up in the production, supply or distribution. According to transaction costs 
economics, the exposure to opportunistic behavior can be achieved through 
different forms of cooperation between business entities ranging from short- and 
long-term cooperation agreements to capital integration. The tendency towards 
institutional association will increase with the rise in frequency of transactions, 
resource specificity and uncertainty. 
Industrial economics exhibits a tendency towards capital integration with 
industry characteristics of business entities. The starting point within this 
approach is the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 1968; 
Hendrikse, 2003). Capital integration is seen as a path for collusion on highly 
concentrated markets. Yin and Shanley (2008) note that the tendency towards 
the institutionalization of cooperation between business entities will be higher 
for those subjects with a greater choice of business partners. Finally, the nature 
of rivalry within individual industries will determine the propensity towards and 
the extent of association. Business entities in industries that require flexibility 
will favor individual activities or weaker forms of association. 
The choice between strategic alliances and capital integration can also be 
explained within institutional economics (North, 1990). The starting point here 
is the view of institutions as mechanisms which reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behavior, simplify the decision-making process and define the boundaries of 
acceptable actions. From there it follows that capital integration will be favored as a 
mechanism for the prevention of opportunistic behavior in a weaker institutional 
environment. Such reasoning is consistent with the transaction costs economics’ 
view that integration of business entities emerges in the presence of market 
imperfections such as the low level of development of institutional framework. 
The discussion above points to three main views concerning the propensity of 
business entities towards capital integration. On the one hand, the propensity 
towards capital integration is driven by the desire to minimize the possibility of 
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opportunistic behavior of business partners. On the other hand, possibilities of 
collusion and expansion on concentrated markets, and thus better performance, 
act as an additional motive for integration. Finally, capital integration emerges 
from the efforts of business entities to improve their performance in an 
underdeveloped institutional environment. 
3  Literature Review
Determinants of propensity towards capital integration among firms have 
been investigated by a number of authors. Majority of this research is focused 
on developed countries while developing economies have been the subject of 
investigation to a lesser extent. The starting point for the majority of studies 
is the choice of business entities in undertaking of activities between market 
mechanisms, weaker forms of association such as strategic alliances and highly 
integrated associations such as joint ventures or capital integration through 
mergers or acquisitions. When it comes to the propensity towards capital 
integration, evidence points to the persistence of certain features in the behavior 
of business entities. 
Evidence from some studies support views expressed by the transaction costs 
economics and resource dependence theory regarding the positive relationship 
between resource specificity and the risk of opportunistic behavior on the one 
hand, and the propensity towards capital integration, on the other hand (Dyer, 
Kale and Singh, 2003; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Geyskens, Steenkamp 
and Kumar, 2006). The above mentioned suggests that business entities strive 
to reduce the risk from negative externalities of market imperfections, such as 
a hold up or renegotiation of transactions. The transition from lower toward 
higher forms of association (e.g., from strategic alliances towards institutional 
integration) also depends on the aims of business entities. Strategic alliances 
seem to be a favorable form of association for business entities aiming at a smaller 
number of objectives (Wegberg, 1995). However, being based on contracts, they 
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fall short to optimal when association is drawn with more complex situations. In 
such conditions, capital integration is a more acceptable option. 
The propensity towards capital integration also depends on industry and market 
characteristics (Hakansson and Snehota, 1995; Trapido, 2007; Haworth, 
Owen and Yawson, 2012). Higher frequency of business interactions broadens 
knowledge on the behavior of rivals and potential partners thus reducing the risk 
of opportunistic behavior. Furthermore, the number of business entities within 
a given industry determines the number of potential partners and relates the 
survival of firms with the need for association. Among industry characteristics, 
existing studies also point to technological intensity and a form of competition. 
The propensity towards capital integration seems to be higher in high technology-
intensive sectors characterized by high resource specificity and larger financial 
challenges of investment in research and development. However, the constraints 
of institutional integration lead to an adverse attitude towards firms in sectors 
characterized by dynamic market competition (Hoffman and Schaper-Rinkel, 
2001). Finally, Haworth, Owen and Yawson (2012) note that business entities, 
which are threatened by their rivals and whose growth is constrained with the size 
of their own resources, will exhibit greater tendency towards capital integration. 
The choice between different forms of association also depends on the attitudes of 
managers and owners. On the one hand, business entities engage in associations 
seeking expansion and better performance. Madhok and Tallman (1998) and 
Li and Prabhala (2007) suggest that the possibility for profit growth, market 
share and shareholders value is connected in favor of institutional association. 
Findings of other authors emphasize the importance of managerial incentives 
and attitudes. The possibility of influence on strategic decisions and activities 
enables trust building and prevents the opportunistic behavior of partners. The 
research within organizational learning theory (Cyert and March, 1963) suggests 
that joint decision making precipitates knowledge transfer and absorption among 
partners. Findings of a few authors suggest that the tendency towards capital 
integration is lower when eventual association implies a loss of decision-making 
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power for managers and owners of business entities (Saxton, 1997; Haworth, 
Owen and Yawson, 2012).
The success and feasibility of capital integration is also determined by the degree 
of similarity between organizational structures of business entities (Hakansson 
and Snehota, 1995; Trapido, 2007). The value added creation potential within a 
united business entity is larger for organizations with similar structures. On the 
one hand, institutional association eliminates redundant activities and leads to 
economies of scale, while on the other hand, a high degree of complementarity 
favors knowledge and technology transfer between partners and enables 
development of new competitive advantages through the pooling of individual 
partner knowledge (Wang and Zajac, 2007).
Existing studies attach particular importance to the dependency of business 
entities on external resources and efforts to minimize the opportunistic behavior 
of partners. To this end, the relevance of previous cooperation through weaker 
forms of partnership such as strategic alliances is emphasized (Saxton, 1997; 
Anand and Khana, 2000; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Kayo et al., 2010; 
Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Chang and Tsai, 2013; Yu and He, 2014; Fang et 
al., 2015; Fich, Nguyen and Officer, 2015). The history of cooperation favors 
reputation building, helps to develop mutual trust and reduces uncertainty 
regarding the potential actions of a partner. Findings within this line of research 
point to differences between synergy benefits of associations among domestic 
business entities and international partnerships. Due to cultural and sociological 
differences, transaction costs tend to be higher in international partnerships, 
thus reducing the positive effects of synergy. 
Findings on the transformation of strategic alliances into capital integration point 
to differences between horizontal partnerships of business entities within the 
same industry and vertical associations with suppliers and distributors. Yu and 
He (2014), using the 1986–2010 data, suggest that horizontal partnerships aim 
at cost efficiency through economies of scale. Vertical associations on the other 
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hand, enable the institutionalization of specific resources and ease the knowledge 
transfer between upstream and downstream firms. From there it follows that 
the tendency towards capital integration will be higher among vertically related 
business entities. Besides previous cooperation through strategic alliances, the 
propensity towards a particular form of association is determined by general 
experience in pursuit of a certain strategy (Barkema and Schijven, 2008; Kayo et 
al., 2010). The complex nature of capital integration makes the related learning 
process extremely demanding. This primarily refers to the negotiating process, 
mutual value assessment, finance, integration etc. Therefore, business entities 
tend to rely on the existing knowledge and learned routines consistent with the 
propositions of evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Other investigated determinants of propensity towards capital integration 
include the size of business entities, the diversification of their products and 
services and ownership (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Haworth, Owen and 
Yawson, 2012; Yu and He, 2014). Findings of a positive relationship between firm 
size and a tendency towards association with other business entities signals the 
existence of relevant financial and nonfinancial resources in large firms that can 
be used for integration with other counterparts. Existing findings also suggest 
the heterogeneity of business entities towards capital integration with respect 
to ownership. Finally, the tendency towards capital integration is larger among 
those business entities whose activities are diversified across a number of sectors 
than among their counterparts focused on a single sector. 
The transition from strategic alliances towards capital integration has also been 
investigated in the context of the retail sector. Chatterjee (2004) notes that the 
propensity towards capital integration exhibits an upward tendency with an 
increase in personal satisfaction concerning the functioning of strategic alliance 
in general and partner behavior in particular. Furthermore, business entities 
within this sector enter such arrangements with the aim to reduce dependency 
on market resources. Barros, Brito and Lucena (2006) conclude on a sample 
of firms from the Portuguese retail sector that capital integration enables price 
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control of the involved business entities. Clarke-Hill, Robinson and Bailey 
(1998) also associate capital integration with greater competitive advantages, 
better product planning strategies and stronger learning effects when compared 
to strategic alliances. 
Even though the relationship between the variety of factors and the propensity 
towards capital integration has been investigated in the existing literature, to the 
best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt to research propensity towards 
capital integration among strategic alliance member firms in general and in the 
retail sector in particular. Furthermore, studies on capital integration processes 
in Central and Southeast European countries (CEECs and SEECs) are rare and 
nonexistent in the context of the retail sector. The gap is particularly pronounced 
in case of countries such as Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina where these issues 
have not been investigated at all. The rest of paper aims to fill this gap. 
4  The Data and the Questionnaire
Keeping in mind the aforementioned, the aim of this chapter is to explore which 
factors and forces determine the propensity of strategic alliance member firms 
from retail sector towards capital integration. Since the existing databases do not 
provide such information and it is not possible to establish the total number of 
retail firms, which are members of the strategic alliance, a survey was undertaken, 
for the purpose of this paper, among business entities members of strategic 
alliances in the retail sectors of eight Central and Southeast European countries 
(Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland, and Estonia). The primary source of data was the Amadeus 
database, the best publicly available source of data on business entities in Europe. 
It is from there that the names, addresses and other relevant information on firms 
in the retail sector of all analyzed countries were taken from. 
Particularly valuable information was the indicator of participation in strategic 
alliance. However, even though Amadeus is commonly labeled as the best pan-
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European firm-level database, it is not immune to weaknesses. The information 
on some or all variables for a certain proportion of firms is missing and the 
information on membership in the strategic alliance is not an exception from 
this occurrence. In order to maximize the sample, the questionnaire was 
emailed to all business entities from the retail sector contained in the database 
in September 2014. This way, out of 3753 retail firms in the database, 736 filled 
out the questionnaire which constitutes about 19 percent of all respondents. 
In a sizeable number of cases, participation in the survey was denied due to a 
corporate prohibition of such activity. Table 1 provides an overview of a number 
of distributed questionnaires and the response rate. 
Table 1:  Geographic Distribution and the Number of Respondents
Country Number of sent questionnaires Number of responses Response rate, in %
Croatia 1642 314 19
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 207 23 11
Slovenia 287 16 6
Slovakia 911 147 16
The Czech Republic 156 45 29
Hungary 142 60 42
Poland 286 87 30
Estonia 122 44 20
Total 3853 736 19
Source: Authors' calculations. 
The questionnaire consists of three sets of questions: general characteristics of a 
business entity, questions about participation in strategic alliance and questions 
on attitudes towards positive and negative effects of potential capital integration. 
In the following segments, we outline the main features for each group of 
questions. 
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4.1  General Characteristics of a Business Entity
The first group of questions encompasses the size of business entities measured 
with the average number of employees in three years prior to the survey, the 
ownership—defined by the respondents as predominantly domestic- or foreign-
owned, and the year of foundation. In addition to these characteristics, the 
subjects were asked to assess one’s own profitability and the growth of revenues 
relative to those of their rivals over a three-year period prior to the survey 
(above average, average, and below average), and to provide information on the 
profitability and revenue growth over the mentioned period. 
4.2  Participation in Strategic Alliance
The second part of the questionnaire provides information on the participation 
of business entities in strategic alliances. Respondents were asked to provide 
information on the number of firms within the strategic alliance with answers 
defined as: up to two members, between three and five, and more than five 
members. Another question asked for the percentage of ownership over strategic 
alliance by the respondent firm (0–25 percent; 25–50 percent; 50–75 percent; 
and 75–100 percent). Respondents were also asked to assess their autonomy 
within the strategic alliance with respect to the management of daily activities, 
human resources management, marketing and distribution, cost, price and 
product management, and capital investment. The answers were defined on a four 
point scale ranging from no autonomy over limited and high degree of autonomy 
to complete autonomy. Finally, firms were asked to estimate the percentage of 
their management actively involved in the management of strategic alliance. The 
descriptive analysis revealed that in over 85 percent of cases surveyed, business 
entities participated in alliances with more than five members and controlled less 
than 25 percent of ownership. In about half of the surveyed firms, more than 
two thirds of managers were actively involved in the management of the strategic 
alliance. 
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Respondents were also asked to assess whether participation in the strategic 
alliance resulted in the introduction of organizational and marketing 
innovations. With respect to the former, the question aimed at changes in the 
supply chain and knowledge management, quality, environment protection, new 
methods for the organization of relationships with an external environment and 
for the organization of work activities and the decision-making process, such 
as team work, decentralization, merger and division of departments, education 
and training. The second question focused on design changes, packaging and 
presentation of products, new channels for presentation and sales of products and 
new pricing methods. For both questions, the dichotomous (yes/no) answer was 
permitted. Over 80 percent of firms attributed the introduction of organizational 
and marketing innovations as those described above to participation in strategic 
alliance. 
Two questions in this part of the survey aimed at the effect strategic alliance exerts 
over the requirements set out for internationally recognized standards in quality 
management and environment protection. Respondents were asked whether 
internationally recognized certificates of quality (e.g., ISO) and environment 
protection (e.g., EMAS) were introduced due to participation in the strategic 
alliance. About one fifth of respondents provided an affirmative answer to the 
question. 
In another set of questions, respondents were asked to assess the role of previous 
cooperation with the members of strategic alliance for several activities including 
trust building, knowledge and skill transfer, and decision-making within the 
alliance. Here, the respondents were required to choose from five answers 
(irrelevant, relatively unimportant, relatively important, very important, and 
absence of previous cooperation with strategic alliance members). Over 80 
percent of respondents considered previous cooperation important for trust 
building, knowledge and technology transfer. Furthermore, more than half of 
the respondents find previous cooperation important for the decision-making 
process within the alliance. 
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4.3  Attitudes toward Capital Integration
The final part of the questionnaire was devoted to the attitudes of business entities 
toward the possibility of capital integration. Here, the respondents were asked 
to assess the prospects of capital integration among strategic alliance members 
defined as unlikely, likely, and very likely. More than half of the respondents did 
not find the transformation of strategic alliance toward capital integration likely. 
About 30 percent of those surveyed consider capital integration likely, while such 
a scenario is very likely for about one fifth of the respondents. 
Three more questions were asked concerning respondents’ expectations on the 
effects of potential capital integration on several aspects of firm performance. In 
the first two questions, responses were constructed as consisting of four options 
(irrelevant, relatively unimportant, relatively important, and very important). 
The first question focused on the expectations of benefits from potential capital 
integration defined as higher market share, product range, sales revenues, 
return on assets, P/E ratio, customer satisfaction, expansion to new markets, 
organizational improvements, and the expansion of capacities. Among these, 
the majority of respondents identified higher market share, greater range of 
products, and the expansion of capacities as either relatively or very important. 
In the second question, the emphasis was on the expectations concerning the 
potential downsides of capital integration defined as higher costs of coordination 
and business, loss of managerial control, and the opportunistic behavior of 
partners. Loss of control over decision-making, the opportunistic behavior of 
partners and higher costs of coordination are considered as relatively or very 
important barriers to capital integration for the majority of respondents. Finally, 
the third question aimed to assess the importance of expectations about short- 
and long-run profits for the prospects of capital integration. 
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5  The Model and Methodology
On the basis of the previously mentioned data, a model was developed for the 
analysis of the relationship between the propensity of strategic alliance member 
firms towards capital integration and the set of variables—including general 
characteristics of business entities, strategic alliance characteristics and attitudes 
of business entities towards the effects of potential capital integration. In general, 
the form model can be formulated as follows:
Propensityi = f (Business entity characteristicsi ; Strategic alliance 
                       characteristicsi
 ; Effects of integrationi
 )             (1)
The dependent variable in equation 1 is defined on the basis of the responses to 
the question concerning the prospects of capital integration among the members 
of strategic alliance. As explained previously, three outcomes are defined as 
attitudes of respondents toward the prospects of capital integration: unlikely, 
likely, and very likely. 
Through various forms of cooperation, strategic alliance members jointly 
participate on the market. A stronger form of cooperation, such as capital 
integration, leaves open the question of individual firms’ contribution to the 
success of strategic alliance. Differences in performance can act as an obstacle 
to further development and the strengthening of the alliance. To explore the 
relationship between individual performance of member firms and their 
propensity towards capital integration, the model includes a variable defined as 
the ratio between the average Return on assets (ROA) of a firm over a three-year 
period prior to the survey and the average return on assets of its industry. These 
data were taken from the Amadeus database. A negative effect of this variable 
labeled Performance on propensity towards capital integration is expected.
Integration of business entities requires the measurement of growth and a 
combination of values of two or more subjects. On the one hand, client base 
and market size grow while on the other hand, capital integration leads to 
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cost reduction and synergy effects. One of the basic preconditions for capital 
integration is an independent, separate assessment of value for each subject and 
an estimation of the desired synergy effects. For this reason, the variable Value—
defined as a ratio between the subjective and objective value assessment—is 
included. This variable is constructed from two variables as it is explained below. 
In section 4.1 it was mentioned that one of the survey questions required 
respondents to assess their own profitability relative to those of their rivals over a 
three-year period prior to the survey as: below average, average or above average. 
These responses were used in the construction of the Value as a subjective 
assessment of a firm value. Section 4.1 also explained that the respondents were 
asked to provide actual figures on their performance (profitability) in three years 
prior to the survey. In the construction of an objective value assessment, these 
data were matched with the data from the Amadeus database. Specifically, the 
Amadeus database was used to obtain information on the average profitability 
of firms in retail sectors of analyzed countries over a three-year period prior to 
the survey. From there, actual average performance of the analyzed firms over a 
three-year period prior to the survey was divided with the average performance 
figures for retail sector firms in each given country. This, in turn, enabled us 
to divide the surveyed firms into three categories on the basis of their objective 
value assessment as: the top 40 percent performers (above average), the bottom 
40 percent performers (below average), and the medium 20 percent performers 
(average). Hence, objective value assessment in the three years prior to the survey 
was finally defined as below average, average, and above average analogous to the 
subjective performance assessment. 
The expression of subjective and objective performance in the same categories 
(below average, average, and above average) enabled us to establish a relationship 
between the subjective and objective value assessment in a three-year period prior 
to the survey and from there to divide firms into three groups. The first group 
includes those entities whose subjective assessment is lower than the objective 
assessment. Business entities whose subjective and objective assessments match 
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each other are in the second group. Finally, those firms whose subjective 
assessment exceeds the objective one fall into the third group. 
It is expected that the subjects whose own (subjective) assessment of value 
underscores the objective assessment are more inclined towards capital integration 
than those where two assessments match each other or those where the subjective 
assessment exceeds the objective one. Hence, from there it is possible to finally 
construct the variable Value which takes 1 if the subjective assessment is lower 
than the objective one (firms where the subjective assessment is below average but 
objective are average or above average, and firms where the subjective assessment 
is average, but objective, are above average) and 0 elsewhere (if the subjective and 
objective value assessments match each other or if the subjective assessment is 
higher than the objective one). A positive sign is expected on this variable. 
In firms where ownership and management are not separated the decision on 
capital integration will be related to the trade-off between the loss of independence 
and management control on the one hand and the expected synergy effects on 
the other hand. To explore the importance of these factors, the model includes 
a categorical variable Control which takes the value of 1 if the respondents 
consider the loss of management rights to be an important determinant of capital 
integration. The model also includes several variables which control potential 
positive synergy effects of capital integration. Two categorical variables are 
included for business entities which consider the prospects of short-run and long-
run profits (Lrprof and Srprof ) important for the decision concerning capital 
integration. It is expected that the loss of management rights negatively affects 
this decision, while positive synergy effects (expectations of profits) will facilitate 
capital integration. 
Several variables, recognized in the literature as important characteristics of 
business entities, are included as well. The size of a firm (Size) is measured with 
a natural logarithm of the number of employees. Market competition requires 
specific skills, knowledge and resources which are costly and difficult to obtain 
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for small firms. For this reason, as noted by the resource-based view, small firms 
will view capital integration more favorably. Along the same lines, the transaction 
cost approach notes that the propensity of small firms towards capital integration 
will be larger due to the intention to reduce the risk of failure and to avoid a 
hold-up problem. A natural logarithm of firm’s age (Age) enters the model as a 
proxy for experience. On the one hand, the experience provides knowledge on 
values, routines and the tradition of a business environment. On the other hand, 
experience can be related to the knowledge about buyer preferences, distribution 
network, business culture, and institutional framework. All these factors ease 
independent market activities of business entities. For the above mentioned 
reasons, younger firms can be more inclined toward capital integration. A 
negative sign is expected on both variables. 
The categorical variable is included as a control for firms with at least 25 percent 
of foreign ownership (Own). Evidence from a number of Central and Southeast 
European countries over the past two decades points to a positive effect of 
foreign ownership on the restructuring and productivity of business entities 
due to knowledge and skill transfer and easier access to finance, inputs, and 
improvements in innovation potential. For these reasons, foreign-owned firms 
can view the association with other domestic firms less favorably. However, 
capital integration can be favored by some firms due to the opportunities for 
expansion on the domestic market and access to local distribution channels. 
Hence, there is no expectation on the sign of this variable. Table 2 provides a 
definition of a group of variables measuring the above described concepts. 
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Table 2:  Description of Variables – First Part
Variable name Description Expected sign
Capital integration 
propensity (capint)
1 – Unlikely 
2 – Likely 





Three years average return on assets (ROA) of a firm i / 





Categorical variable (1 if the subjective assessment of 
the firm's profitability in a three-year period prior to the 
survey is lower than the objective one) 
+
Importance of loss of 
management control 
(Control)
Categorical variable (1 if the potential loss of 
management control is considered important for the 




Categorical variable (1 if the potential of long-run profits 





Categorical variable (1 if the potential of short- run 
profits is considered important for the decision on 
capital integration)
+
Firm size (Size) Natural logarithm of the number of employees -
Firm age (Age) Natural logarithm of the firm’s age -
Firm ownership (Own) Categorical variable (1 if the firm is foreign-owned) NA
Source: Authors' calculations. 
The model also includes several categorical variables recognized in the literature 
as characteristics of the strategic alliance, namely the size of the alliance (Size) 
taking the value of 1 if the alliance has more than five members; the share of 
managers involved in alliance activities (Mngown), taking the value of 1 if more 
than 60 percent of managers participate in alliance activities; the percentage of 
alliance ownership (Alown) which takes the value of 1 if a firm owns above 50 
percent of the alliance; and the perception of firm autonomy within the alliance 
(Authon) which takes the value of 1 if a business entity has significant autonomy 
or can independently make decisions within the alliance with regard to capital 
investment, sales, costs and pricing, quality, design or promotion. A greater level 
of trust and thus a higher propensity towards capital integration is expected 
among firms in smaller alliances and a negative sign is expected on this variable. 
Furthermore, a higher involvement of managers in the activities of the alliance 
and a larger share of ownership enable a better control over alliance activities, 
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while a wider autonomy in decision-making reduces fears over loss of control. It 
can, therefore, be expected that business entities with a larger share of ownership, 
a higher share of management and a wider autonomy within strategic alliances 
have a higher propensity towards capital integration. 
The propensity towards capital integration is related to the experience in 
cooperation with other members of the strategic alliance. The model includes 
three variables constructed on the basis of the respondents’ opinions on the 
importance of previous cooperation among strategic alliance members for trust 
building (Trust), knowledge and skill transfer (Transfer) and decision-making 
within the alliance (Decision), which take the value of 1 if firms consider previous 
cooperation with strategic alliance members important for any of the above 
outlined processes. It is expected that business entities who share a history of 
cooperation have a lower fear of opportunistic behavior of partners and will 
therefore have a greater propensity towards capital integration. Hence, a positive 
sign is expected on all three variables. Table 3 provides a description of variables 
outlined in the two paragraphs mentioned above. 
Table 3:  Description of Variables – Second Part
Variable name Description Expected sign
Alliance size (Alsize) Categorical variable (1 if the alliance has more than five 
members)
-
Share of ownership in 
alliance (Alown)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm owns more than 50 
percent of the alliance)
+
Percentage of managers 
involved in alliance 
activities (Mnginvolv)
Categorical variable (1 if more than 60 percent of 
managers participate in alliance activities) 
+
Perception of firm 
autonomy within the 
alliance (Authon)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm has a high degree of 
autonomy in decision-making)
+
Trust (Trust) Categorical variable (1 if the previous cooperation with 
the alliance members was important for trust building)
+
Knowledge and skill 
transfer (Transfer)
Categorical variable (1 if the previous cooperation with 





Categorical variable (1 if the previous cooperation with 
alliance members was important for decision-making)
+
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Several variables enter the model as controls for the changes in firm’s performance 
due to participation in strategic alliance. Variable Orginno takes the value of 1 if 
firms consider that organizational innovations introduced through participation 
in alliance reduced the time required for a response to the needs of clients and 
suppliers, improved potential for product and process innovations, raised quality 
of goods and services, reduced costs and facilitated information sharing with 
other firms and institutions. Variable Mktinno takes the value of 1 if firms 
consider that marketing innovations introduced through participation in the 
alliance led to an increase in market share, penetration of new markets and 
reaching out to new customers. Business entities whose innovation activities were 
facilitated through participation in the alliance are expected to have a greater 
propensity towards capital integration than firms which did not experience such 
synergy effects. Thus, a positive sign is expected here as well. 
The survival of firms requires meeting certain quality standards, while the 
social responsibility of business entities requires them to take into account 
environmental protection. To this end, the model includes two categorical 
variables for business entities which acquired internationally recognized 
certificates of quality (Qual) and environment protection (Env) as a consequence 
of participation in the strategic alliance. Possession of such certificates can signal 
the orientation of business entities toward long-run survival. A positive effect on 
propensity towards capital integration is expected. Description of these variables 
is provided in Table 4.
Table 4:  Description of Variables – Third Part
Variable name Description Expected sign
Organizational 
innovations (Orginno)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm introduced 




Categorical variable (1 if a firm introduced marketing 




Categorical variable (1 if a firm acquired internationally 





Categorical variable (1 if a firm acquired internationally 
recognized environment protection certificate due to 
strategic alliance)
+
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Final sets of variables control the effect of expectations concerning the potential 
downsides and benefits from capital integration on prospects of such an outcome. 
With respect to former, three categorical variables are introduced taking the 
value of 1 if a business entity considers: being under threat regarding partner’s 
opportunistic behavior (Opport), the increased costs of business (Costs), and the 
increased costs of coordination (Coor) as important determinants concerning the 
decision on capital integration. Further three categorical variables control those 
business entities which expect capital integration to lead towards organizational 
improvements (Orgben), improvements in the market (Mktben) and financial 
(Finben) aspects of their activities. While the former three variables are expected 
to negatively influence the propensity towards capital integration, the effect 
of the latter three is expected to be positive. Finally, categorical variables are 
included to control country-specific effects with Croatia being taken as the base 
category. Table 5 provides the description of the final set of variables. 
Table 5:  Description of Variables – Fourth Part
Variable name Description Expected sign
Partner opportunism 
(Opport)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm considers potential 
opportunistic behavior of a partner to be a barrier to 
capital integration)
-
Increase in business 
costs (Costs)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm considers an increase in 
business costs to be a barrier to capital integration)
-
Increase in costs of 
coordination (Coor)
Categorical variable (1 if a firm considers an increase 





Categorical variable (1 if a firm considers capital 
integration to lead to an increased market share, new 




Categorical variable (1 if a firm considers capital 





Categorical variable (1 if firm a considers capital 
integration to lead to organizational improvements, 
increased product range, and the expansion of capacities)
+
Country (Ctry) Categorical variables (for each included country – base 
category: Croatia)
NA
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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The analysis is undertaken with the means of a multinomial logit econometric 
technique, a maximum likelihood generalized logistic regression for situations 
where a dependent variable takes two or more outcomes. The use of this model 
enables an estimation of the relative probability of choice between two or more 
offered alternatives. For n alternatives, multinomial logit estimates n-1 equations 
and confronts them to the base category. The underlying assumption behind 
estimation is that the probability of choice of one alternative over another is 
independent of other alternatives which are considered irrelevant in that case. 
Such assumption originates from the nature of logistic regression and assumption 
about independently distributed and homoscedastic disturbances (Greene, 2002). 
To control for potential heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors are used. Table 
2 provides the names and descriptions of variables. 
6  Discussion of the Findings
The first step in the estimation of econometric models is the assessment of their 
validity through relevant model diagnostics. One of the key assumptions of 
multinomial logistic models is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). 
This assumption implies that the inclusion or exclusion of additional categories 
does not affect the relative ratio of probabilities related to independent variables 
in other categories. A common test for IIA is the Hausman test where the null 
hypothesis is the independence of alternatives. Results of the Hausman test, 
presented in Table 6, reveal that there is insufficient evidence to reject the 
hypothesis on the independence of alternative specifications.
Table 6:  Independence of the Irrelevant Alternatives Test
Alternative chi2 Degrees of freedom p > chi2
Unlikely 30.551 33 0.590
Likely 15.670 33 0.995
Very likely 22.503 33 0.916
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Further testing procedure addresses the possibility that independent variables 
do not significantly influence the probability of choice of a particular outcome 
over others. If none of the independent variables influences the probability of 
choice of a particular outcome over others significantly, more efficient estimation 
of parameters can be obtained through joining of individual outcomes (e.g., 
outcome: likely and very likely). Results of the Wald and LR test, presented in 
Table 7, reveal that none of the three possible outcomes can be combined with 
the remaining ones. Keeping the above mentioned in mind, it can be concluded 
that relevant diagnostics provide support to the model.
Table 7:  Combination of the Alternatives Test
Test/Alternative chi2 Degrees of freedom p > chi2
Wald test H0: Alternatives can be combined
Unlikely and likely 118.656 32 0.000
Likely and very likely 93.890 32 0.000
Unlikely and very likely 82.131 32 0.000
LR test H0: Alternatives can be combined
Unlikely and likely 243.021 32 0.000
Likely and very likely 182.614 32 0.000
Unlikely and very likely 106.815 32 0.000
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Results obtained through the estimation are presented in form of relative risk 
ratios, i.e. the probability of choice of one outcome over the baseline category. 
Relative risk ratio is calculated as an exponent of linear coefficients obtained 
through the regression analysis. Such obtained figures are interpreted in a way 
where values below 1 suggest that unit change in independent variable reduces the 
probability of choice of an alternative over the base category, while values above 
1 suggest the opposite. In continuation of the analysis, results are presented in 
terms of both linear coefficients and relative risk ratios. However, for expositional 
convenience, further interpretation will be undertaken with the means of relative 
risk ratios. 
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Table 8 presents the estimation of the impact of independent variables on the 
choice of respondents between alternatives 1 and 2 (capital integration unlikely 
and capital integration likely). Results, as seen in Table 8, regarding performance 
indicators, subjective and objective value assessment, loss of control perception, 
and short- and long-run profit expectations, are all significant. Obtained findings 
are in line with the expectations. Better performing business entities are less 
inclined towards capital integration as expected. Furthermore, business entities 
whose subjective value assessment is lower than the objective one have a higher 
propensity towards capital integration. It also seems that the aversion towards 
loss of management control reduces the propensity towards capital integration, 
while the expectations of long-run profits have a positive effect. 
Among the characteristics of business entities, the only significant variable 
is the size of the firm. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that larger 
business entities are more prone to capital integration, which is not in line with 
the expectations. A likely explanation is that through capital integration large 
firms try to eliminate their competition. Based on the findings concerning the 
characteristics of strategic alliances, it can be concluded that business entities 
in alliances with a larger number of members, and those with a higher share 
of ownership in alliance favor capital integration more than their counterparts 
from alliances with fewer members and those with a smaller share of alliance 
ownership. While the latter finding is expected, the former is opposite to our 
expectations. A likely explanation is that capital integration is more favored in 
large alliances as it can reduce complexities in alliance activities. 
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Table 8:  Results of the Analysis (Base Category: Option Capital Integration “Unlikely”; Option 
Capital Integration “Likely”)
Variable Linear coefficient Relative risk ratio p–value
Performance -0.03 0.97 0.053*
Value 0.67 1.96 0.016**
Control -1.63 0.20 0.000***
Lrprof 1.445 4.24 0.001***
Srprof 0.39 1.48 0.460
Size 0.20 1.22 0.064*
Age -0.02 0.98 0.935
Own 0.29 1.33 0.439
Alsize 3.13 22.88 0.000***
Alown 2.55 12.76 0.044**
Mnginvolv -0.47 0.62 0.331
Authon -0.07 0.93 0.884
Trust -2.20 0.11 0.000***
Transfer -1.53 0.22 0.003***
Decision 2.03 7.61 0.001***
Orginno -4.41 0.01 0.013**
Mktinno -1.33 0.26 0.148
Qual 3.84 46.35 0.000***
Env 1.69 5.45 0.197
Opport 1.54 4.68 0.206
Costs -1.43 0.24 0.039**
Coor -1.48 0.23 0.002***
Mktben 0.41 1.51 0.539
Finben 0.48 1.61 0.536
Orgben 0.71 2.03 0.687
ctry_BH 3.99 54.25 0.077*
ctry_CZ 3.21 24.72 0.000***
ctry_EE 1.19 3.27 0.141
ctry_HU 2.94 18.82 0.000***
ctry_PL 0.83 2.28 0.185
ctry_SI -1.02 0.36 0.558
ctry_SK 3.06 21.38 0.001***
Number of observations 736
Note: ***, ** and * denote a significance at 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Entities which consider previous cooperation important for trust building, 
knowledge, and skill transfer, as well as those which introduced some kind 
of organizational innovation or acquired internationally recognized quality 
certificate due to participation in strategic alliance, have a lower probability 
of capital integration. However, the opposite holds for firms which consider 
previous cooperation with other members of alliance important for decision-
making within the strategic alliance. Surveyed firms also consider an increase of 
coordination and business costs as barriers to capital integration. 
Table 9 provides the results of the estimation of the impact of independent variables 
on the choice between unlikely and very likely capital integration. As mentioned 
previously, the propensity towards capital integration increases if the subjective 
value assessment underscores the objective one, and among those subjects who 
consider long-run profit expectations important for capital integration. On the 
other hand, potential loss of control and a better performance of a business entity 
reduce the propensity towards capital integration. Larger firms seem to be more 
prone towards capital integration while the opposite holds true for foreign-owned 
firms. Such findings can be interpreted in the context of gaining an easier access 
to business resources through channels of their foreign owners. Among alliance 
characteristics, business entities in alliances with a larger number of members 
are more likely to engage in capital integration. However, the coefficient on 
the variable in control of the involvement of firm’s management in activities of 
alliance suggests that such firms have a lower probability of engaging in capital 
integration. Together, these findings seem to support our earlier reasoning. 
Firms in alliances with a larger number of firms favor capital integration as a 
means of reducing alliance complexities, while their management, aware of these 
problems, is less favorable toward further association with other firms.
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Table 9:  Results of the Analysis (Base Category: Option Capital Integration “Unlikely”; Option 
Capital Integration “Very Likely”)
Variable Linear coefficient Relative risk ratio p–value
Performance -0.03 0.97 0.046**
Value 0.83 2.29 0.006***
Control -1.30 0.27 0.000***
Lrprof 0.85 2.34 0.042**
Srprof 0.69 1.99 0.184
Size 0.20 1.22 0.052*
Age 0.13 1.14 0.515
Own -2.01 0.13 0.001***
Alsize 1.23 3.42 0.095*
Alown 1.20 3.32 0.210
Mnginvolv -1.37 0.26 0.003***
Authon -0.36 0.70 0.474
Trust -0.38 0.68 0.538
Transfer -0.63 0.53 0.158
Decision 0.09 1.10 0.878
Orginno -1.00 0.37 0.562
Mktinno 0.60 1.82 0.420
Qual 0.82 2.28 0.214
Env 2.47 11.83 0.072*
Opport 3.79 44.23 0.001***
Costs 1.09 2.97 0.086*
Coor -1.51 0.22 0.001***
Mktben -0.26 0.77 0.672
Finben -1.61 0.19 0.015**
Orgben -2.40 0.09 0.130
ctry_BH -1.32 0.27 0.510
ctry_CZ 1.81 6.11 0.001***
ctry_EE 0.23 1.26 0.752
ctry_HU 1.90 6.66 0.005***
ctry_PL -0.32 0.72 0.600
ctry_SI -1.20 0.30 0.380
ctry_SK -0.03 0.97 0.966
Number of observations 736
Note: ***, ** and * denote a significance at 1, 5, and 10% significance level.
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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The acquisition of certificate on environment protection through strategic 
alliance increases the chances of capital integration. Similar findings hold true 
for firms which consider potential opportunism and increased costs of business 
as possible effects of capital integration. On the one hand, this signals that firms 
try to protect themselves from potential opportunism of partners through capital 
integration. On the other hand, it seems that for business entities, who consider 
capital integration very likely, the rise of business costs is seen as a necessary 
part of adjustment to the new business conditions. Finally, the rise of costs of 
coordination reduces the chances of capital integration. 
7  Conclusions
Improvement of market position requires continuous upgrading of competitive 
advantages. For numerous business entities the lack of their own human, capital, 
technological, financial and other resources presents an important obstacle to 
the achievement of this objective. For such business entities, supplement of 
one’s own weaknesses through cooperation and integration with other business 
entities remains a precondition for survival and expansion. The benefits of 
synergy include a better cost and organizational efficiency, stronger negotiating 
power with suppliers and distributors, barriers to entry and greater customer 
satisfaction. However, integration of resources brings along the loss of autonomy 
in decision-making, complicates the relationships within the alliance and comes 
together with the risk of opportunistic partner behavior. From the point of view 
of a business entity, the decision on capital integration requires the analysis of 
a trade-off between previously mentioned benefits and the negative effects of 
synergy. 
Business entities make a choice between different forms of association depending 
on the specificity of the desired objectives. Short-run objectives, which are not 
characterized by specific resources, can be achieved through strategic alliance. 
However, the achievement of long-run objectives requires from business entities 
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a stronger form of institutional integration, such as capital integration. Feasibility 
of the latter process depends on the readiness of business entities to make 
compromise and undergo structural changes. The decision on capital integration 
is also determined by subjective factors, such as the perception of the firm’s value 
and the attitude towards the loss of managerial control. Everything said suggests 
that the decision on capital integration is a complex process which depends on a 
number of objective and subjective factors. 
The aim of this paper was to explore which factors and forces determine the 
propensity of business entities, strategic alliance members, in the retail sectors of 
several Central and Southeast European countries towards capital integration. To 
this end, particular attention was given to the effects of firm performance, value 
assessment, loss of autonomy and managerial control, as well as profit expectations 
on capital integration. The past two decades in Central and Southeast European 
countries were characterized by processes of transition and restructuring. The loss 
of traditional markets, the dissolvement of existing distributional networks and 
the pressure of foreign—frequently more competitive rivals—on the domestic 
market, as well as changes in customer preferences, have made the adjustment 
to new-market environment a precondition for survival. This was particularly 
emphasized in case of business entities whose activities are constrained by a lack 
of previously mentioned resources. Integration of these resources paves the way 
to their survival and improved competitiveness. 
The results based on the questionnaire developed for the purpose of this paper 
reveal a low propensity of business entities towards capital integration. Better 
performance, fear of the loss of managerial control and a fear of opportunistic 
partner behavior, as well as a high subjective assessment of the firm’s value, are 
among the key reasons behind such development. It seems therefore that firms view 
capital integration primarily as means of survival in a competitive environment. 
The chances of capital integration are also determined in accordance with the 
firm’s size, degree of trust among partners, costs of coordination, and business 
activities. 
108
Nikola Butigan and Đuro Benić
Determinants of Capital Integration among Strategic Alliance Members in the Retail Sector: ...
Croatian Economic Survey  :   Vol. 18   :   No. 2   :   December 2016   :   pp. 77-112
Overall, the obtained findings suggest that business entities engage in integration 
with the aim of reaching hidden knowledge and skills, accessing distribution and 
supply channels, and developing new products and services. Integration is also 
driven with the aim of risk diversification and possible better market positioning, 
achieving economies of scale, and improving organization and marketing. Its 
strongest barrier is the opportunistic behavior of partners and limited managerial 
control. To this end, the importance of previous cooperation as a factor which 
facilitates trust building, knowledge and skill transfer, and reaching compromise 
in the decision-making process, is emphasized. How can these findings be 
understood? Together, they point to obvious market failures in the analyzed 
countries. Such failures prevent the realization of transaction through market 
mechanism and force firms to seek various forms of association as channels for 
overcoming these obstacles. 
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